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Abstract 
A significant contributor to China’s growth over the last 20 years is the ‘go-out’ policy, that is, 
for domestic firms to invest in international firms and has seen it develop a foundation of high 
technology industries and world leading research. We find that across China, the ‘go-out’ 
policy needs support from provincial governments in terms of human capital, basic research 
and infrastructure to ensure that imported technology is effectively absorbed into the local 
economies. This means a national strategy needs local tuning to the needs of the region.  Across 
all provinces, we find that during the period 2006 to 2016 outward foreign direct investment 
(OFDI) spillovers have a significant and positive impact on technology innovation as measured 
by patents. OFDI alone is insufficient and may crowd out local research and development 
(R&D), as such, those provinces need to get to a threshold of absorptive capacity in basic, 
applied research supported by human capital and R&D capital stock. When the gap between a 
province and the rest of the world is large then OFDI could have a crowding out effect without 
the province supporting basic research. We test for structural changes across all provinces by 
classifying them by either having large or small frontier technology, the proxy for absorptive 
capacity. We find that the role of human capital and basic research changes substantially 
between small gap and large gap provinces indicating that regional policy makers need to 
ensure that policies are fine tuned to the stage of development in a particular region and will 
change over time. OFDI effects are diminished as the provinces gap reduces and this may be 
particularly timely in the face of China being subject to increasing trade and investment 
pressure internationally. 
Key words: Technological innovation, government policy, OFDI spillovers, technology gap, 
threshold effect, basic research and applied research. 
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1 Introduction 
From 2000, the Chinese Government actively promotes a ‘go-out’ investment policy. This 
encourages domestic firms to invest in foreign countries and markets using outward investment 
funds flow in ‘exchange’ for a flow of technology and knowledge. Why? In part ‘a catch up’ 
and ‘go past’ the developed economies by improving productivity that promotes economic 
growth. The strategy intention is to increase domestic wealth creation sustainability whilst 
promoting foreign political and economic influence in the world for by productivity 
improvement is through the foreign knowhow1 acquisition and absorption into provincial 
economies.  
This Chinese national and international strategic policy raises important questions, such as, is 
the effect the same for all provinces? Or are the spillovers subject to a threshold effect 
determined by the current development of the provinces? The Chinese government has a 
problem with the unequal distribution of wealth generating activities across provinces, which 
has the effect of displacing populations from poorer rural areas, so over-burgeoning the 
infrastructure and over-populating in some areas, potentially creating the seed for civil unrest. 
The concentration of industry in the east has already had significant impacts on the population, 
environment and wealth distribution.  
Internationally, China faces significant sanctions from developed countries for promoting a 
coordinated transfer of intellectual property from developed nations, via various means, to 
Chinese firms when investing or buying from China. This may limit the opportunities to gain 
FDI (foreign direct investment) as outlined by Almfraji and Almsafir (2014). 
The 2017 World Investment Report indicates that Chinese multinationals (MNE) invested 
US$183bn in 2016, a substantial increase of 44% from 2016. Can we establish the motivation 
for this significant increase in OFDI by Chinese MNCs? Chakrabarti (2001), Mathews (2006) 
and Rui and Yip (2008), all give insights into some of these motivations. Developed countries, 
particularly the US, have responded to China’s expansion with sanctions and protections to 
prevent mass knowledge and intellectual property transfer2. Namely, to limit the impact of 
sanctions or other protection mechanisms by. The strategy is through the investment channel, 
                                                 
1 We use the term Knowhow, in the quasi legal context, that includes all aspects of knowledge and expertise 
needed to make something or deliver a service.  
2 The US has recently (2018-19) imposed significant sanctions and restrictions on China, in part to limit the flow 
of imports. 
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including joint ventures and buyouts, and acquisitions. Furthermore, Chinese firms might 
perceive some existing gap between their technology capabilities and those they are investing 
in. This raises another line of inquiry on how efficient and effective Chinese firms are at 
transferring and utilising the technology and expertise. At a government level, an efficient 
process would support the Chinese growth strategy. Many other emerging economies are 
seeking to ‘short-cut’ technological development and would look to China as a model in how 
to achieve this, if it is efficient. This would give China some political and economic sway on 
the world stage.  
We also need to consider investment effects domestically, specifically in technological 
innovation and spillovers. Villa (1990) defines technological innovative capacity as the 
outcomes of all corporate and individual invention. Similarly, Furman et al. (2002) as the 
ability to commercialise innovative technology over the long run. What impact does OFDI 
have on innovation? For the more traditional inward investment, Coe and Helpman (1995) 
clearly establish a link between inward investment flows and technological innovation. For the 
host country, they can take capital and advanced technology and skills to augment the existing 
technology (De Mello, 1999; Mariotti et al., 2015; Farrell, 2008; Almfraji and Almsafir, 2014). 
For the investing country, it allows foreign companies to seek new markets abroad at the cost 
of sharing knowhow (Mariotti et al., 2015; Farrell, 2008). 
This knowhow carries the potential for spillovers into other firms (Lai et al., 2006; Liu and 
Buck, 2006; Keller and Yeaple, 2009). The effect is most prevalent when there is a significant 
technological gap between the developed country investor and developing country’s firms. 
This is not a new phenomenon; such developments are recorded throughout history with 
examples from the Roman empires and other empires3. However, for OFDI to be a success, the 
reverse would need to occur, that is, capital flows outwards and technology knowhow flows 
inwards (Li et al., 2016a). These international interactions not only provide investment, they 
also provide a mechanism to close the technology knowhow gap partially through spillovers 
(Almfraji and Almsafir, 2014).  
For our analysis we seek to answer three questions: 
1. Does Chinese OFDI boost domestic technological innovation? 
2. Do regional differences through the technology absorption threshold affect the rate of 
                                                 
3 Although these two examples are principally exploitative, they do illustrate the point of inward investment and 
the transmission of technology knowhow. 
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OFDI spillovers and the rate of technological innovation? 
3.  Do regional differences in the technology gap between a region and the rest of the 
world affect the technological innovation outcomes from basic and applied research 
and, OFDI?  
This paper contributes to the literature by developing an understanding of China’s strategy to 
import technological knowhow and so maintain growth across all its provinces. One of the 
characteristics of China’s strategy is to develop the provinces to a level so they can take up 
technological innovation efficiently. We demonstrate a threshold effect where a foundational 
level of development is required in the provinces prior to exploiting OFDI channels. Our 
innovation is that basic research, applied research and OFDI have different joint impacts on 
technological innovation based on different technology gaps. This influences the political 
decision making at both provincial and national level by determining the funding and 
deployment of foundational applied research. It also determines levels of infrastructural and 
human capital development required in the provinces.   
Following the introduction, we review the existing literature, and develop the hypotheses that 
then leads to the methodology and framework, after a brief summary of the data, we report and 
analyse the results followed by the policy implications and conclusions.  
2 Literature Review 
To progress, developing countries use an OFDI strategy to overcome the barriers, in particular, 
in the transfer of knowhow from developed countries by intellectual property protection, 
limiting knowledge transfer and imposing sanctions on countries with low property rights 
protections. The prospective developing country MNE needs to go international to gain 
domestic advantage and overcome these international trade barriers (Wells, 1983). In the 
developing world it is possible for firms to substitute labour for capital investment. This allows 
then to undercut developed economies and enable exporting and acquisition of foreign 
currency. When these burgeoning MNE are threatened by sanctions or restrictions, they seek 
alternatives though OFDI (Chakrabarti, 2001). It is somewhat harder for developed countries 
to impose investment restrictions on a foreign MNE in an open market. This provides a 
pathway that motivates developing country MNE to gain transfers of knowhow though 
investment (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Rui and Yip, 2008; Luo et al., 2010; Ramasamy et al., 
2012; Chen and Tang, 2014). China, as with other developing countries such as India, continues 
to encourage OFDI at the governmental level.  
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The strategic interests of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE) and private firms may be 
different, hence their investment decisions divergent (Ramasamy et al., 2012). Many Chinese 
SOE tend to invest in access to increasingly scarce natural resources thereby securing the 
supply for their industries and potentially giving political and economic power on the world 
markets. This draws many similarities to the European colonial period and the US involvement 
in Oil and energy resources in the 20th century. These tend to be in challenging political 
environments where past ‘occupiers’ have suppressed whereas China is seen more as a 
‘partner’ in development bringing a level of economic and political stability (Rui and Yip, 
2008). However, private OFDI tends to focus more on knowhow capture from secure 
developed nations though either technology acquisition or process, management and 
production performance knowhow (Chen and Tang, 2014). This provides the first motivation, 
namely, empirically evaluating the impact of such knowhow acquisition on Chinese domestic 
technological innovation.  
One of the core issues facing China’s OFDI strategy is; does it have enough absorptive capacity 
to fully exploit the acquired technology and knowhow?  Much of this capacity is dependent on 
a spillover effect into firms that have the knowledge and expertise to exploit both technology 
and knowhow efficiently (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Breschi and Lissoni, 2001; García‐
Morales et.al, 2008). This is reliant on how well knowledge is managed and disseminated 
(Zahra and George, 2002; García-Morales et al., 2008), the human capital in the form of 
education, skills, capabilities and abilities of people to take on and utilize technology and 
knowhow (Glass and Saggi, 1998; Zahra and George, 2002; Comin and Hobijn, 2004) to utilize 
in R&D though to production (Mowery and Oxley, 1995). This implies that there must be a 
level of domestic development to ensure that the gap not to be so wide as to be a barrier to 
efficient take up of knowhow, that is a threshold of human capital, technology and R&D 
capability for efficient knowhow transfer for a given level of developed world technology and 
knowhow being imported. There are several other factors that interplay with efficient 
absorption including openness (Comin and Hobijn, 2004; Lai, et al., 2006), financial market 
efficiency (Hermes and Lensink, 2003; Alfaro et al., 2004) and the rule of law. These factors 
are somewhat subservient to the main factors above. We empirically analyse the inward foreign 
direct investment (IFDI) and OFDI spillovers by using human capital, technology and R&D 
capacity’s impact on technology progress to determine if a threshold effect exists. 
Commonly, a technology gap index is there basis for absorptive capacity in IFDI spillovers 
analysis, hence we apply the same index to OFDI. A wide technology gap is most likely to 
encourage imitation that can lead to a narrowing of the gap and improve absorptive efficiency, 
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hence capacity (Verspagen, 1992; Glass and Saggi, 1998; Girma et al., 2001). Most empirical 
studies are at a national level (Liu et al., 2005; Buckley et al., 2007). This may lead to variable 
results due to the limitations in aggregation at a national level that largely compromise any 
conclusions (Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu , 1973-6).  
Each firm has its own development path, ownership and technology gap and individual firm 
micro level data for Chinese firms is not available. This leads us to using provincial level data 
to describe differences within regions. Spillovers are both geographically constrained and 
industry classification specific in nature minimizing the distance for knowledge transfer 
(Hamida, 2013). This tend map closely to the Chinese regions trends to specialize particular 
industries. Although this does not fully overcome some of the objections to aggregation, it does 
address the main issue of national level aggregation and maps closely to the Regional 
Innovation Systems Theory (Asheim et al., 2011). Furthermore, provincial level data is readily 
available over a reasonable time period for most of the provinces. This is enough to give insight 
into absorptive capacity threshold effects for comparisons at both regional and provincial level.  
Li et al. (2016a) and Piperopoulos et al. (2018) claim that OFDI boosts product innovation and 
facilitates productivity gains mapping technological innovation and absorptive capacity. The 
labour force tends to be regional in nature and with infrastructural development then OFDI 
spillovers have positive impact on regional technological innovation (Wang and Blomström, 
1992; Crespo and Fontoura, 2007; Hamida, 2013; Rojec, 2018). This supports the view that 
provincial data is sufficient for our purpose. 
There is a contradiction in the literature regarding the effectiveness of OFDI. Edamura et al., 
(2014) find that at firm level data supports the hypothesis that firms achieve their goals with 
OFDI whereas Bai (2009) concludes that these reverse spillovers into technological 
innovations are not significant. To contrast, Li et al. (2016b) identify that there is significant 
difference in OFDI spillovers from east to western China with the effects being more limited 
in the west. Furthermore, R&D and human capital have much greater effects than OFDI 
indicating that these are critical channels for China to progress. Another is the OFDI effects in 
both short and long run, Yang et al. (2011) identifies that the results are regional with the level 
of development. This view is supported by Bruce and Chang (1991) and Rudy et al. (2016) that 
the heterogeneous nature of firms and regions in their technology capacities determines if OFDI 
spillovers are significant.  
The Chinese government plays an important role in technological development in providing 
the necessary institutions to support development. Many developing countries suffer from 
institutional constraints that either limit possibilities or encourage to look abroad. (Luo et al., 
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2010; Child and Rodrigues, 2005). Such institutions including rule of law, enforcement of 
contracts, IP protection, capital controls and inability to control corruption may discourage 
development (Nolan, 2005). Partially, to overcome these barriers, government provides 
financial support for OFDI (Taylor, 2002; Rui and Yip, 2008) and overseas opportunity 
intelligence gathering (Luo et al., 2010). We ask, what can the Chinese government can do to 
with allocation of resources for scientific research to maximize the impact of OFDI spillovers? 
To address the gaps in technology firms can introduce frontier technology to boost innovation 
(Coe et al., 2011) and combine R&D with absorbed technology to create new technology 
(Osano and Koine, 2016). This presents a problem, resource allocation where both are costly. 
Factors such as resident preference, frontier technology distance, the development of the 
market, R&D efficiency also affect the decision of R&D (Osano and Koine, 2016; Cardenas et 
al., 2018; Piperopoulos et al., 2018).  
Technology improvement is the core of economic growth (Romer, 1990). Core to growth is 
technology development through scientific research- applied research and basic research 
(Gulbrandsen and Kyvik, 2010; Henard and McFadyen, 2005). There are many empirical 
studies proving the advantages of public-funded basic research despite the limitations of 
methodology (Arrow, 1972; Nelson, 1959; Park, 1998). It is complementary for market failure 
and can boost technological innovation in the whole system (Nelson, 1995). Since the cost of 
basic research is high and the time before the appearance of outcomes is long, private sector is 
discouraged to invest in it. Taxpayers are only willing to finance basic research when it 
produces significant social returns (Nelson, 1959). One empirical research proves the higher 
social welfare resulted from basic research financed by private sector (Rosenberg, 1990). Thus, 
this research focuses on the role of government in conducting basic research to improve the 
overall technology absorptive capability for better absorption and use of foreign technology.  
  
Between basic and applied research, there is competition for resources (Park, 1998; Akcigit et 
al., 2016). A limitation for the spread of the basic research is distance (Narin et al., 1997). 
Furthermore, the choice between basic research and applied research within a country or a firm 
based on technology gap (Rosenberg, 1990; Belenzon, 2006; Lai et al., 2006; Ha et al., 2009). 
Belenzon (2006) demonstrates that these types of research should be technological innovation 
complementary to cover frontier technology distance. One recommends that when the 
technology gap is relatively small, the government is responsible for more investment into 
basic research such as increasing the recruitment of higher education (Ha et al., 2009). 
Therefore, as frontier technology gap is a crucial factor influencing the technology capabilities 
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including absorptive capacity and innovative ability, it constraints the OFDI spillovers’ and 
scientific research’ s impact on technological innovation. Furthermore, because basic research 
can increase the general stock of technology which strengths technology capabilities, the 
efficient amount of basic research can affect OFDI spillovers.  
Since the government is the driving power for Chinese OFDI and plays an important role for 
the investment of basic research. It can take advantage of its related policy to maximize the 
technological benefit of OFDI spillovers. The primary goal of this research is to find the 
threshold effect of technology gap influencing OFDI spillovers’ impact on technological 
innovation. Then, on basis of the threshold, provinces can be divided into big technology gap 
group and low technology gap group to find out the political implications of scientific research 
for better use of OFDI for the acquisition of advanced technology and the creation of new 
technology. Thus, local authorities can apply to their own conditions when giving support to 
OFDI. It can still be a useful indication for local firms within a province since their resources 
are based on its location. By horizontal comparison with other firms in similar or related 
industries in the region, they can assess their own conditions about whether to invest abroad or 
not instead of blindly following the trend. A review of the most recent literature relevant to 
FDI and R&D is summarised in Table 1.   
 
TABLE 1 
Table 1 - OFDI and innovation review of the recent literature 
Study Method  Time  Sample Region Outcomes 
Acs et al. 
(2002) 
OLS 1982 8,074 
commercial 
innovations 
125 US 
metropolitan  
Patent are a reasonable proxy for 
innovation, however, silent 
economic value to economy. 
Borensztei
n et al. 
(1998) 
2SLS and 
3SLS 
1970–79, 
1980–89 
1380 69 
Developing 
countries 
Developing countries FDI is an 
important tool for the transfer of 
technology and contributes 
economic growth in developing 
countries. 
Braconier 
et al. 
(2001) 
OLS, fixed 
and random 
effects 
1978 -1994 217  84 Swedish 
firms 
There is a strong positive 
relationship between OFDI and 
technology spillover effect. 
Buck et al. 
(2006) 
Probit and 
Tobit 
1998-200. 5,861 
foreign-
invested, 
7,697 
Chinese 
firms 
China Technological innovation can be 
boosted by  IFDI  with a positive 
consequence on economic growth. 
Coe and 
Helpman 
(1995) 
OLS and 
WLS 
1976-1989 
excl. 1980 
4,000 plants Venezuela That FDI/FII does not lead to 
technology spillovers  
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Study Method  Time  Sample Region Outcomes 
Comin and 
Hobijn 
(2004) 
Pooled and 
fixed 
effects  
1788–2001 23 countries 
and 25 
technologies  
23 industrial 
Countries 
Human capital and income have a 
positive effect on technology 
adoption. 
Lee (2006) Dynamic 
OLS 
1981-2000 320 16 OECD 
countries 
The IFDI effects on international 
knowledge spillovers. 
Li et al. 
(2016b) 
Fixed 
effects 
threshold 
2003- 2013 290 29 Chinese 
provinces 
OFDI benefits of reverse 
knowledge spillover when the 
technology gap between a 
province and MNEs' host 
countries. Double-threshold 
effects of technology gaps.  
Pavitt et al. 
(1987) 
OLS 1945-1983. 4000 
innovations 
UK U-Shaped relation between firm’s 
size and innovation output.  
Huang et 
al. (2012) 
Fixed 
effects 
threshold  
1985-2008 696 29 Chinese 
provinces 
Double-threshold effects of 
regional innovation on 
productivity spillovers from FDI. 
Tan et al. 
(2016) 
Pooled 
mean group 
and mean 
group  
1986-2011 128 8 ASEAN 
countries 
Both IFDI and outward OFDI 
have a positive impact on the gross 
domestic investment. 
Wang et al. 
(2016) 
Fixed 
effects 
threshold 
2000 -2011 360 30 Chinese 
provinces  
The FDI technology spillover has 
two threshold effects of the 
technology gap in China. 
Zhou et al. 
(2019) 
FGLS  2004-2014 341 31 Chinese 
provinces  
The relation between OFDI and 
domestic innovation is positive in 
developing countries but negative 
in emerging markets. 
 
3 Hypotheses, theoretical framework and methodological approach 
The three questions above map directly to the three hypotheses to test, namely: 
1. Chinese OFDI boosts domestic technological innovation.  
2. That OFDI spillover generates a rate of technology innovation that is dependent on an 
absorptive capacity threshold being met within a geographic region. 
3. That there are distinct joint impacts from basic and applied research and OFDI, on 
technological innovation, in the context of regional differences with respect to 
technology gaps. 
These hypotheses, if the evidence supports them, infer that OFDI has a material benefit with 
regards to technological innovation. Furthermore, that the degree of up take is dependent on 
the absorptive capacity of the provinces, demonstrating that the technology gap needs to be 
sufficiently wide, however not overly so to drive development and that it needs to be supported 
by both basic and applied research.  
We develop three models to test these claims and subsequently imply some policy implications. 
However, we acknowledge that our initial hypothesis 3 requires a subsidiary test component 
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that we discuss later. These models are based on the transformational process of less-developed 
countries in terms of technology introduction, absorption and innovation (Romer, 1990; Coe 
and Helpman, 1995).  
3.1 Hypothesis 1 (H1): Chinese OFDI boosts domestic technological innovation 
There is a presumption in the first hypothesis, that Chinese firms can absorb all the technology 
quickly, efficiently and deploy it effectively to increase innovation. This depends on the 
infrastructure, current technology levels, human capability and, willingness to learn and 
develop (Bitzer and Kerekes, 2008; Li et al., 2016a). These investigations adopt similar IFDI 
spillover methods and theories such as for technology (Coe and Helpman, 1995), and the LP 
model (van Pottelsberghe and Lichtenberg, 2001) for instance to analyse OFDI (Wang et al., 
2016; Li et al., 2016; Piperopoulos et al., 2018). Although some of these studies identify that 
significant technology gaps are likely to moderate the effects of OFDI (Wang et al., 2016; Li 
et al., 2016a), the data in these studies is somewhat historical and potentially less applicable in 
today’s environment, particularly in the Chinese provinces. Intuitively, one would consider that 
until a region has enough development in terms of both human and technological capital then 
that region’s ability to absorb is somewhat limited. This leads us to the next hypothesis. 
For the view that Chinese OFDI boosts domestic technological innovation, we need to observe 
that a measure of technology advancement has a significant positive relationship with OFDI 
whilst controlling for inward investment, R&D, human development and net exports at a 
provincial level over time (Coe and Helpman 1995). Following Griliches (1979), Hall and 
Ziedonis (2001) and Acs et al. (2002) and the general trend in the literature, we use the proxy 
of the intellectual property (IP) measure (authorized patents). A core driver for IP is domestic 
R&D (RD) supported by human capital development (HC) and the three channels for 
international spillovers: IFDI, import (IM) and export (EX) (van Pottelsberghe and 
Lichtenberg, 2001; Li et al., 2016b; Filippetti et al., 2017; Zhou et al., 2019). We take logs of 
all variables to form the linear model:  
𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛼1𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑠 + 𝛼2𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  (1) 
where the dependent variable is 𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 which is the number of authorised patents in province 𝑖 at 
time 𝑡, 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 is the total inward foreign direct investment to China, 𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the total exports, 
𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the total imports, 𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 inward foreign direct investment from country 𝑖 to China, 𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡 
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is the human capital level and 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑠  is the stock of R&D investment, 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 is the total outward 
foreign direct investment from China.  
As stated already, we use the flow of authorised patents as the proxy for the flow of 
technological development following Griliches (1979), Li et al. (2016a), Hong et al. (2019) 
and Zhou et al. (2019). This could be somewhat problematic in that patents are not necessarily 
of the same technological benefit nor do they cover all development (Griliches, 1990; Arundel, 
2001; Cuddington and Moss, 2001). This is especially when patent protection in the host 
country is somewhat in its infancy, therefore alternative methods such as secrecy may offer 
better protection (Griliches, 1979). The alternative is R&D expenditure which measures only 
the resources put towards development which may not account for beneficial outcomes. 
Furthermore, accounting practice may differ across firms and lead to inconsistent results.  
Although IP is potentially problematic as a proxy, it is from a primary source which is not 
reliant on differences in reporting. It likely to understate the level of development, thus 
amplifying the effect of the inputs. Many of these criticisms are overcome by Li et al., (2016a) 
and overall it is accepted in the literature as a reasonable proxy. 
When it comes to R&D, then we use the depreciated stock of all accumulated R&D investments 
in a province at time t. following the normal description for R&D inventories as set out in Coe 
and Helpman (1995) and Coe et al. (2009), hence: 
𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑠 = (1 − 𝛿)𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆 + 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑒         (2) 
where 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑠  is the R&D inventory in province 𝑖 at time t,  𝛿 is the R&D depreciation rate and 
𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑒   is the R&D expenditure in province 𝑖 at time 𝑡. We normalise all R&D to 2006 prices. 
This implies that for a province to grow R&D inventory then 𝛿𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 < 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑂. This presents a 
problem, although we know the investment per period, we do not know the R&D stock. Again 
following Coe and Helpman (1995), we use the calculated present value of R&D stock at 𝑡 =
0 by: 
𝑅𝐷𝑖,0
𝑠 =
𝑅𝐷𝑖,0
𝑒
(𝑔+𝛿)
           (3) 
where growth rate in R&D expenditures are calculated by 𝑔 = (
𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑇
𝑒
𝑅𝐷𝑖,0
𝑒 )
1/𝑇
and then rolling 
forward (3) above to calculate every year’s total R&D investment stock. By summing the 
provinces per period it provides the Chinese total level of R&D investment stock, formally: 
𝑅𝐷𝑡
𝑠 = ∑ 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑆
𝑖∈𝐼           (4) 
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We construct OFDI using the two step process set out in van Pottelsberghe and Lichtenberg 
(2001), Hong et al. (2019) and Zhou et al. (2019). Firstly, the domestic OFDI related R&D 
capital stock is obtained: 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡 = ∑
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑗 𝑅𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑠          (5) 
where 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡  is the R&D stock China obtains from its OFDI towards country 𝑗 in year 𝑡 and 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡  is the GDP of country 𝑗 in year 𝑡. We translate nominal into real by dividing 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑡  
by 𝑃𝑗𝑡 . The 𝑅𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑠  is the R&D stock of the country 𝑗 at the time 𝑡, it can be obtained using the 
same method as above: 
𝑅𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑠 = (1 − 𝛿)𝑅𝐷𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑆 + 𝑅𝐷𝑗,𝑡
𝑒        (6) 
where 𝑅𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑠  is the R&D inventory in country 𝑗 at time 𝑡,  𝛿 is the R&D depreciation rate and 
𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑒   is the R&D expenditure in country 𝑗 at time 𝑡. Then the OFDI of the province is calculated 
by using the proportion of province OFDI stock relative to the domestic one.  
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡 ×
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡
∑ 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑖
        (7) 
The computations of inward FDI which is IFDI in this model, imports and exports are similar. 
Stock is better than flow for these tests because of its stability. The analysis of stocks is more 
suitable for research on the effect of IFDI spillovers in the longer term (van Pottelsberghe and 
Lichtenberg, 2001). As the Chinese firms investing in developed countries are more likely to 
be frontier technology seekers (Rui and Yip, 2008；Luo et al., 2010；Ramasamy et al., 2012), 
G7 countries (America, Canada, Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Japan) which are highly 
developed in technology are chosen as the targeted countries.  
3.2 Hypothesis 2 (H2): That OFDI spillover is dependent on an absorptive 
capacity threshold 
The absorptive capacity constrains the effectiveness of FDI. Absorptive capacity is a function 
of R&D investment stock and human capital (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Dussauge et al., 
2000; Glass and Saggi, 1998; Mowery and Oxley, 1995). In equation (1), we control the 
heterogeneity by the fixed effects model. If the OFDI’s coefficient for a province is significant 
and positive, then OFDI has an impact on technological development. To resolve this, we need 
to employ a threshold model to understand if thresholds exist and at what level. Equation (8) 
sets a threshold (TH) and determines the OFDI coefficient below and above that threshold. If 
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a threshold exists and is significant in both coefficients then we check for two thresholds and 
so on (Wang, 2015; Li et al., 2016b). We employ the fixed-effects threshold model here 
(Hansen, 1999, 2000). The model is: 
𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑚,𝑖,𝑡𝑚∈𝑣 𝑣𝑚,𝑖,𝑡   + ∑ 𝛽𝑘,𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡(𝜃𝑘−1 < 𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝜃𝑘  )
𝐾+1
𝑘=1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  (8) 
𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑚,𝑖,𝑡𝑚∈𝑣 𝑣𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡(𝜃1 > 𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑘,𝑖,𝑡𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ×
𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡(𝜃1 ≤ 𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖𝑡        (9) 
𝑣 = {𝑅𝐷, 𝐻𝐶, 𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼, 𝐼𝑀, 𝐸𝑋}  
𝑇𝐻 = {𝑃𝐺, 𝐻𝐶, 𝑅𝐷} 
𝜃 = {−∞, 𝜃1, … , ∞} 
where 𝐾 + 1 is the length of set 𝜃, elements 𝜃1 … are threshold parameters, 𝑃𝐺 is the 
productivity gap and 𝑇𝐻 is the threshold variable computed by the Hansen methodology. Note 
that if 𝑅𝐷 or 𝐻𝐶 is the threshold variable then it does not appear in the linear part of the model.  
We use the three proxies for the technology gap, these being the productivity gap, human 
capital and R&D stock. For the productivity gap (𝑃𝐺), we follow Kokko (1994),  Castellani 
and Zanfei (2003) and Hong et al (2019), which involves using real GDP per capita.  For human 
capital, we follow Glass and Saggi, 1998; Zahra and George, 2002; Comin and Hobijn, 2004; 
Zhou et al., 2019 to measure the absorptive capacity. Meanwhile, the R&D effort, spending on 
training and the ability to hire a well-educated labour force indicates the resources that a firm 
has (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Glass and Saggi, 1998; Mowery and Oxley, 1995). We apply 
the productivity gap, R&D stock and human capital to observe if technological absorptive 
capacity has a threshold effect. 
This is similar to the drivers for ‘clustering’ of similar firms in geographical regions that we 
have observed throughout the industrial age. These prior studies do not consider that there is 
some ‘threshold’ where the absorptive capacity rapidly increases once the ‘foundations’ for 
development are set. Naturally, this implies some form of motivation. To find what motivates 
and facilitates the technological innovation. We move to the next hypothesis. 
3.3 Hypothesis 3 (H3): Regional impacts from research and OFDI, on 
technological innovation 
Our approach is to utilise the thresholds from H2 to classify provinces into two groups, large 
and small gaps. This allows us to explain how absorptive capacity influences the absorption 
effect of OFDI spillovers. Furthermore, also how this effect influences the technological 
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innovation incentive effect of basic research. A non-significant threshold does not necessarily 
imply thresholds have no effect. We should expect that a small technology gap would lead to 
lower acquisition of technology spillovers suggesting that the absorptive capacity is not being 
fully utilised (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Martínez-Senra et al., 2015).  
Salter and Martin (2001) identify that scientific research including applied and foundational or 
basic research is core to moving technological innovation forward. As in Nelson (1959), the 
difference between applied research, focusing on practical inventions and product 
development, and basic research in its effects on absorption and innovation capacity indicates 
that basic research is the foundation for absorptive capacity. Therefore, as these two forms of 
research have different but joint effects and there is little in the way of recent research on these 
effects, we need to consider the relative roles of applied and basic research, so we add a 
subsidiary to this hypothesis to clarify the distinct and joint impacts. 
Foundational or basic research tends to be riskier, more expensive and lengthy than applied 
research thus governments tend to conduct or fund this type of research with the intention of 
producing spillovers into the private sector4 (Nelson, 1959). The government can take on much 
greater risks and deploy greater resources to attain research objectives. Therefore, the private 
sector tends to focus on applied research that it can turn into marketable intellectual property 
and profitable products arising out of the work of government. Basic research would be 
significantly curtailed if only left to the private sector, thus governments’ have a role in 
promoting basic research for the benefit of society (Park, 1998).  
Of course, such research depends on the constraints of infrastructural capacity, human 
capability, resource availability and the absorptive capacity of industry. As such, government 
needs to consider if its research agenda is enhancing or displacing private sector R&D through 
such constraints, particularly in the context of OFDI. Regional government authorities need to 
cognisant that human capital, the R&D infrastructure and ability to absorb technology impose 
on addressing the technology gaps with foreign countries.  
We utilise the Arrow (1972) and Park (1998) model extended by Cassiman et al. (2002), 
Henard and McFadyen (2005) and Gulbrandsen and Kyvik (2010) to explore the impact of 
applied and basic research on knowledge accumulation in conjunction with the technological 
                                                 
4 Examples are in Space exploration where governments took the lead and eventually, we will observe the 
commercialisation by the private sector. This also include military research stemming back to the basics of radar, 
sonar, GPS providing the foundations for much applied research. Much foundational medical research is 
government funded particularly in the areas of vaccines and genetics.  
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spillovers absorption effect and innovation incentive effect, to determine if the can improve the 
technological innovation capability of firms. The model specifies the interaction between 
applied and basic research, the models include the provincial government (state) investment, 
measures of infrastructure development (road pavement) and per capita GDP to determine the 
province’s technological development. We specify the model thus:  
𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌11 + 𝜌11𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌12𝐴𝑖𝑡 × 𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌13𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌14𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌15𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌16𝑝𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 +
𝜌17𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡         (10) 
where 𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 are as before,  𝐴𝑖𝑡  and 𝐵𝑖𝑡 is the applied basic research respectively. 
Basic Research is research that tries to expand the already existing scientific knowledge base 
largely on a theoretical basis whereas applied research solving real-life problems using 
scientific study, that is by developing practical solutions to real-world problems. The 
interaction term 𝐴𝑖𝑡 × 𝐵𝑖𝑡 represents the incentive innovation effect of basic research. We 
control for the number employed (𝐻𝑖𝑡), provincial government investment in fixed assets 
(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡), the per capita real GDP (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡), and as a proxy for infrastructure the paved roads 
area (𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡) following Higón, (2016). The 𝑢𝑖 is the provincial fixed effect and the 𝑣𝑡 is the 
time fixed effect. However, we need to determine the level of applied research 𝐴𝑖𝑡, we do this 
by the process of Nelson (1959) by estimating the equation: 
𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌21𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌22𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌23𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌24𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡   (11) 
and 𝐵𝑖𝑡 × 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 indicates the absorptive effect of OFDI spillovers of basic research. Note that  
𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡  and 𝐴𝑖𝑡  occur in both 10 and 11 creating an endogeneity problem that we solve by using 
three stage least squares.  
4 Methodology and data 
4.1 Econometrics approach 
Our methodology combines the frameworks from the literature with the addition of some 
critical extensions to an extended and updated panel dataset (in Appendix A) to test the three 
hypotheses outlined above. In summary our approach is: 
Collect the data from the various sources, combining it into a panel covering the timeframe and 
provinces with the inclusion of relevant controls, ensuring that it is consistent and reliable by 
performing summary statistics (see Appendix A) and other tests. We use unit root tests such as 
Levin, Lin & Chu (2002), Im, Pesaran, Shin (2003), Fisher ADF and Fisher PP, Maddala and 
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Wu (1999) and Choi (2001), to test for stationary in the panel data for each series. The next 
step is to determine the lag length for the hypotheses. We use the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) to determine the selection of lags for all the dynamic time series analysis. Once we are 
satisfied with the combined panel checks then we can test the hypotheses.   
Starting with H1, we test for the direct impact of OFDI on technological innovation in a 
province with and without lags. As this is a panel, we use the Hausman test, as suggested by 
Wu (1973), and Hausman (1978), to exclude pooled and random effects. If this is the case, then 
this implies that H1 is more suited to the fixed effects analysis.  
Moving next to H2, were thresholds are important to our analysis, we apply the Hansen (1999, 
2000) method to identify any threshold effects with their confidence bands for the threshold 
parameter. This provides a method of endogenously estimating the threshold level and its 
significance in a non-linear specification. The determination of thresholds is by beginning with 
identifying the first significant threshold then finding the second significant threshold and so 
on until there are no more significant thresholds. 
Finally, H3 poses a problem of the simultaneous equations being over identified. This limits 
the possibility of using OLS, two stage least squares (2SLS), limited information maximum 
likelihood (LIML) and generalized method of moments (GMM), so directing us towards three 
stage least squares (3SLS), system GMM and/or Full Information Maximum Likelihood 
(FIML). This provides us with the linkages between variables whereas OLS etc. does not, so it 
increases the efficiency of the estimation. Therefore, we use 3SLS.  An F-test on the first stage 
identifies if it addresses the issue of endogeneity. For consistency we expect an F-stat of greater 
than 10. We separate the provinces into two groups, namely, large and small technology gaps5 
as identified from H2. We expect that basic and applied research to have lag effects. We 
introduce controls for the one period and two period lagged values of applied and basic research 
respectively. In addition, we control for differences in the provincial and national economic 
factors, to consider the individual fixed effect and time fixed effects. We add to this hypothesis 
a subsidiary hypothesis to further explain the dynamics. 
4.2 Data  
We utilize a panel of 31 Chinese provinces covering the time period 2006 to 2016 including 
all the above variables sourced principally from the Chinese year book. We add in the controls 
                                                 
5 The Technology gap is a measure of the level of technological development as benchmarked with the rest of the 
world, particularly the main trading partners.  
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such as employment, government investment, output and infrastructure. We normalize all 
prices to 2006 international US dollars. Prior to 2006 data for some provinces such as Xinjiang 
and Tibet is somewhat limited. Furthermore, this extends and updates the studies by Hong et 
al. (2019), Xia et al. (2016) and Li et al. (2016b) by using a more comprehensive dataset with 
significant methodological extensions. For a detailed analysis of the data sources and issues 
refer to the Appendix A.  
5 Results 
We report the results from our empirical analysis of the three hypotheses here in the same order 
as specified in the methodology section above. 
5.1 Panel data tests and results 
We report the results of the unit root test and AIC determined lags tests in Table 2. This 
identifies that none of the data exhibits a unit root. Furthermore, we identify that the lags 
between 1 and 3 are the most relevant for dynamic equation analysis. 
Table 2- Unit Root and AIC results 
Variable Levin, Lin & Chu Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat 
ADF - Fisher 
Chi-square 
PP – Fisher Chi-
square 
Lags 
𝐼𝑃  -12.25*** -1.51*** 97.31*** 132.02*** 3 
𝑅𝐷  -24.77*** -11.89 244.36*** 292.60*** 1 
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼  -5.74*** -0.87 69.78 57.63 1 
𝐼𝑀  -9.10*** -0.35*** 93.72*** 144.50*** 1 
𝐸𝑋  -27.86*** -6.38*** 169.34*** 102.18*** 3 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼  -31.18 -5.11*** 138.31*** 153.75*** 3 
𝐴  -21.36*** -11.28*** 231.99*** 275.67*** 1 
𝐵  -23.11 -11.52*** 234.62*** 323.18*** 1 
𝐺𝐴𝑃 -39.91*** -27.66*** 418.05*** 417.22*** 1 
𝐻𝐶  -6.39*** -1.82** 87.87** 35.83 1 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
5.2 OFDI spillovers boosts technological innovation  
Table 3 reports the OLS regressions, fixed effects and random effect models that test H1. We 
observe that the Hausman test confirms that the fixed effects model is preferable to the 
OLS/pooled and random effects models. R&D is the main driver of technological innovation 
as one would expect. Regarding OFDI, this is both positive and significant in both level and 
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lag models indicating that OFDI has both an immediate and lasting effect on technological 
innovation, albeit small compared to R&D. This effect is observed across all provinces 
indicating that the Chinese government strategy of ‘go-out’ to the private sector has a 
materially positive impact on domestic innovation. Note that in the lagged OFDI models where 
OFDI plays a more significant role, than the R&D role, which is about 12% less indicating that 
OFDI is more important than R&D. This would lead us to consider that some level of R&D 
needs to be present for OFDI to be effective. We will explore this further in the next hypothesis.  
Other than R&D and OFDI, all other variables are insignificant at the 5% level, only imports 
are significant but at the 10% level. This reinforces the point that R&D and OFDI are the 
significant determinants of regional innovation. Although domestic firms may observe and 
imitate imports (Coe and Helpman, 1995; Liu and Buck, 2006), this may not necessarily lead 
to increases in innovation. It is one skill to be able to copy and imitate, quite another skill to be 
able to create new knowhow and expertise that is exploitable. This is where absorptive 
capacity, the base level of skills and knowhow may come into play.  
Regarding IFDI, the structure and controls in the Chinese economy may limit the effects of 
inward investment putting up barriers to offshore companies owning significant interests in 
Chinese innovation. Rather, the driving force may be more towards joint ventures and 
partnerships where the Chinese firms are seeking to transfer knowledge. These findings 
somewhat align to Piperopoulos and Wang (2018) in that the knowledge transfer and 
innovation performance are enhanced by OFDI. 
One question could be that OFDI investments may not only render direct results on domestic 
innovation immediately but as one would expect, it may also occur over multiple subsequent 
periods. This leads us to explore and report on more dynamic variations in terms of the OFDI 
first and second lags, individually and collectively (columns 4 to 8). We note that in Table 3 
that first and second lags individually (t-1 and t-2) are significant and positive and the lagged 
coefficients are increasing with time. This implies that OFDIs take time to be absorbed by the 
domestic economy. This leads us to test current and lagged combinations. OFDI with one lag 
is not individually significant, however, they are jointly significant in Table 4 and this 
continues for all combinations implying that OFDI has to be sustained over time to have a 
marked effect on domestic innovation. The policy implication is that government needs to have 
a sustained consistent outward investment policy over many years. This suits the Chinese 
economy whereas a government that may change every 3-5 years may experience 
inconsistency and limit the effects of such a policy. 
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TABLE 3 
Table 3 - China's provincial effects on Innovation and OFDI 
Variable OLS RE FE 
(level) 
FE  
(t-1) 
FE 
(t-2) 
FE 
(t,t-1) 
FE 
(t,t-2) 
FE 
(t,t-1,t-2) 
𝑹𝑫 1.06*** 0.90*** 0.60*** 0.64*** 0.53*** 0.60*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 
𝑰𝑭𝑫𝑰 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 
𝑰𝑴 -0.15* -0.11 -0.08* -0.05 0.003 -0.05 -0.001 -0.01 
𝑬𝑿 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 
𝑶𝑭𝑫𝑰 0.05** 0.04** 0.11***   0.05 0.02 0.04 
𝑶𝑭𝑫𝑰−𝟏 
 
   0.09***  0.05  0.04 
𝑶𝑭𝑫𝑰−𝟐 
 
    0.11***  0.11*** 0.12*** 
𝑯𝑪 -1.36*** -0.38 -0.38 -0.21 -0.29 -0.31 -0.32 0.26 
𝑪 -0.64 -2.37*** 1.47 -0.15 0.83 0.67 1.26 0.50 
𝑹𝟐 0.91 0.90 0.98 0.89 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.87 
𝑭 − 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄 691.21*** 679.48*** 109.92*** 337.24*** 257.35*** 290.31*** 219.91*** 192.14*** 
𝑯𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝑻𝒆𝒔𝒕1   17.91***      
𝑯𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝑻𝒆𝒔𝒕2   30.92***      
Note: ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. OLS= Ordinary Least-squares, 
FE= Fixed effects, RE= Random effects, Hausman Test1= FE VS RE and Hausman Test2= FE to OLS.  
Table 4 - Joint significance test results  
Wald Test  FE(t,t-1) FE(t,t-2) FE (t,t-1,t-2) 
𝐹 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐  7.26*** 7.65*** 5.24*** 
𝜒2 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 14.51*** 15.29*** 15.73*** 
In Table 4, we observe that R&D is significant in all cases. However, if we take into account 
the level and lagged OFDI then the magnitude of the coefficient decreases indicating that OFDI 
has a role over time of about one quarter of that of domestic R&D. This supports the normative 
approach that both domestic R&D and sustained OFDI need to be present to increase domestic 
innovation.  
IFDI and exports have little impact on innovation outcomes leading us to believe that foreign 
controlled investment and exports use productive capacity rather than innovative capacity. 
They have little domestic benefit other than the streams of income from exports and the labour 
force employment increases (Wei, 2010). As our focus is on OFDI, we shall leave that issue 
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for other studies. Likewise, the coefficient of imports is negative but insignificant indicating 
little impact of imports on innovation. Although local firms can observe, study, imitate and 
upgrade imported products (Coe and Helpman, 1995; Liu and Buck, 2006), its spillover’ effects 
on technological innovation are also influenced by absorptive capacity (Eaton and Kortum, 
1996; Liu and Buck, 2006). This may contradict some political viewpoints that China’s 
imitation and acquisition of foreign IP through these channels are the main drivers for their 
own innovation. Rather this activity may boost exports providing a flow of funds to domestic 
firms that they can employ into OFDI and R&D, this again is a subject for further investigation. 
Finally, with human capital (HC), one would expect that human capital, in part, drives 
innovation output. Surprisingly, we find that this is not so in the presence of OFDI, regardless 
of lags. This seems to contradict the norms that domestic human development leads to 
improved outcomes over that where humans are just labour in a process. There are many studies 
into human capital development and its impacts, particularly in developing countries (Lai et 
al., 2006; Huang et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2019). They indicate that there needs to be a base 
level of education, knowledge and knowhow to engage with R&D and the repatriation of 
technological innovation to be able to turn this into domestic innovation outputs. This implies 
some form of threshold of human development as a prerequisite for R&D, exploitation of 
repatriated technology and innovation outputs. We will discuss this under the threshold model 
next. 
5.3 The technology absorptive capacity threshold effect  
Our interest now turns to the capability of Chinese provinces to absorb technology and whether 
there is a threshold level applying to the productivity gap, human capital and R&D stock. If 
thresholds exist, then we should observe different innovation performances as a province 
crosses a threshold.  
Table 5 reports the results of our single and double threshold tests. Following on from H1 and 
comments on human capital, we find that there is a single threshold indicating that there is 
some minimum level of human development necessary for effective absorption of technology 
from outside sources confirming what we suspected from H1. Note that there is only one 
threshold implying that a country, in this case China, needs to ‘break though’ by developing its 
domestic population’s skills, expertise and knowhow though education and training. One could 
deduce that any developing country attempting to absorb foreign technology needs to attain 
some level of human development to exploit the technology effectively. This implies that 
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government policy needs additional impetus towards education, training, knowhow retention 
and skills development to ‘jump start’ innovation (Li et al., 2016a; Zhou et al., 2019).  
R&D also has a threshold indicating that there needs to be a level of R&D investment activity 
in prior years to build R&D capability. This implies that R&D tends to a critical mass where 
ideas, knowhow and people interact in networks to becomes efficient in producing innovative 
outputs. We observe this effect throughout history with clustering in such places as Silicon 
Valley (US) for Computational technology, Detriot (US) in the 1930’s and the Midlands UK 
for vehicle development and Ruhr and Rhine valleys (Germany) for Heavy industry in the early 
part of the 20th century.  
Table 5 – Thresholds Test Results 
Threshold Variable Threshold 𝜽𝒊 95% CI F-statistic 
Productivity Gap 1st 13.85 [13.19, 13.89] 18.53 
 2nd 8.17 [7.550, 8.23] 8.29 
Human Capital stock 1st 6.70 [6.69, 6.71] 59.09*** 
 2nd 6.25 [6.07, 6.57] 21.99 
Research and Development Stock 1st 9.05 [8.67, 9.14] 57.04*** 
 2nd 13.60 [13.60, 13.62] 33.37 
Notes: **, *** and * show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 95% CI = 95% confidence interval. 
In Table 6 we report the results from the interaction of a threshold variable with OFDI using 
the first threshold reported in Table 5. As before, R&D is a substantial contributor to the 
innovative outputs whereas IFDI, IM and EX are not. Although the threshold may not be 
significant the coefficients either side are implying that rather than being a point it is a 
transitional curve. When the productivity gap is wide, OFDI needs to make up the shortfall in 
to gain the necessary research outputs to increase productivity. We will discuss the potential 
for OFDI to crowd out innovation later. If the productivity gap is small then OFDI has 
effectively served its purpose in accelerating development to developed world standards. 
However, this relationship has a breakpoint where OFDI has much less effect on output, with 
a diminishing improvement in innovation as the gap is closed.  
This naturally raises the question, is there a similar threshold for human capital stock and R&D 
as suggested by Table 5 when there is an interaction with OFDI? We observe a threshold in 
both cases (Table 6). Human capital has a pronounced difference in the coefficients indicating 
that OFDI has a doubled effect when human capital development is low than it does when 
human capital is high. Likewise, with R&D, although there is an effect, it is more limited. Note 
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that both human capital and R&D coefficients are significant and in the case of HC, particularly 
pertinent in the presence of the R&D threshold. We can imply that both human capital and 
R&D are significant contributors to innovation in the face of OFDI. OFDI, as a policy, has a 
significant role in developing intellectual capacity and knowhow when reinforced with policies 
around human capital development and R&D activities. As the domestic HC and R&D matures 
then the effects of OFDI tail off and China becomes more self-reliant on its own capabilities. 
We observe this with the maturing of Chinese corporations now directly competing in 
innovation with developed nations. Exploiting this channel has and continues to be somewhat 
of a ‘leg-up’ for Chinese innovation.  
In theoretical terms, one could draw parallels to the Solow growth model where more advanced 
provinces tend to have less to catch up thus reducing the spillover effect of OFDI in that 
geographic region (Wang and Blomstrom, 1992; Keller and Yeaple, 2009).  
We observe a similar effect in India over a longer period. The complications in applying this 
inference to other developing nations is that in the case of British Commonwealth countries or 
were a prior war destroyed the industrial infrastructure. The late 19th and though to early 20th 
century saw IFDI activities driven out of the UK more to create cheaper materials for the home 
market. The late 20th century saw India now taking the lead in OFDI in the UK coming to some 
prominence in Information technology, manufacturing and raw materials production. The US, 
under the Marshal Plan (and others) saw much IFDI into Germany6, Japan, South Korea and 
other SE Asian countries driven by political needs rather than economic reasoning. Again, 
Japan and South Korea conduct extensive OFDI across the developed world.    
Considering these limitations, India could provide some parallels to China, being similar in 
population, educational distribution and in the same geographic region7. Both have followed 
similar paths in developing their export manufacturing, then building on that and in the case of 
India for example developing pharmaceuticals initially for its own population and then 
progressively competing on the world stage in both manufacturing and innovation. Similar 
parallels can be found in information technology, space and defence where India was initially 
a ‘body shop’ or manufactured for developed countries but now takes the technology lead in 
many international programmes through its OFDI efforts supported by improving absorptive 
                                                 
6 Germany was already a heavily industrialised nation with world leading innovation. As with Japan, most of the 
industrial complex was destroyed and needed to be rebuilt, a lesson learnt from WW1. 
7 Note that China is a one party state with largely long term central planning and control whereas India has a 
democratic system where there is less control over the long term stability of government plans. 
24 
 
capacity (Iqbal et al., 2018). As with China, India now has a substantial R&D base in both 
academia, primary research and industry with applied research. Unlike some developing 
countries, both India and China have a reasonable level of political stability, although 
corruption and enforcement of property rights may impose limitations. We will leave further 
debate on this to future research. 
Table 6 - The estimates of OFDI technology spillovers for single-threshold 
Variable TH=Productive gap TH= Human capital TH=R&D  
𝑅𝐷 0.55*** 0.53***  
𝐼𝐹𝐷𝐼 0.05 0.05 0.06* 
𝐼𝑀 -0.07 -0.05 -0.01 
𝐸𝑋 0.02 0.08 0.09* 
𝐻𝐶 -0.26  1.17*** 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼 × 𝑇𝐻 (𝑇𝐻 ≤ 𝜃1) 0.11*** 0.20*** 0.36*** 
𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼 × 𝑇𝐻 (𝑇𝐻 > 𝜃1) 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.22*** 
Constant 1.96 -1.23** -4.69*** 
 𝑅2 0.86 0.85 0.23 
𝑭 − 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄 354.83*** 501.88*** 4.76.27*** 
Notes: ***, ** and * show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
5.4 OFDI, basic and applied research and, innovation technology gap.  
The |Hypothesis tested now is: That there are distinct joint impacts from basic and applied 
research and, OFDI, on technological innovation, in the context of regional differences in 
technology gaps. 
Using the results from H1 and H2, we divide the provinces into two classifications, those with 
a large technology gap and those with a small gap to compare the joint and distinct impacts of 
research on innovation when accounting for the gap. In Table 7, we report the results of running 
3SLS for each classification of the provinces, with large and small technology gaps, to consider 
separately applied and basic research and total research, that being the interaction between 
applied and basic research. In addition, we consider OFDI separately and its interaction with 
basic research.  
Table 7 – Role of applied research: 3SLS analysis of the grouping in the frontier technology distance 
 
 
Dependent 
Large Small 
Separate Interaction Separate Interaction 
𝑰𝑷 𝑨 𝑰𝑷 𝑨 𝑰𝑷 𝑨 𝑰𝑷 𝑨 
𝑰𝑷  0.26*  0.55***  -0.03  -0.35*** 
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𝑨 -0.45**    -0.71    
𝑩 0.94***    0.92    
𝑨 × 𝑩   0.29***    0.09***  
𝑶𝑭𝑫𝑰 -0.03 -0.89*** 0.01 -0.72*** -0.02 -0.90*** -0.002 -0.99*** 
𝑩 × 𝑶𝑭𝑫𝑰  0.83***  0.65***  0.89***  0.99*** 
𝑯 1.01*** 0.10 0.69*** -0.13*** 1.29*** 0.27*** 1.22*** 0.66*** 
𝑯𝑪 -0.56*** 1.03*** -1.10*** 0.95*** 0.37*** 1.04** -0.11*** 2.72*** 
𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬 -0.88**  -0.83**  -0.49  -0.51  
𝒑𝑮𝑫𝑷 0.52***  0.35***  0.31***  0.30***  
𝒑𝑰𝑵𝑭 -0.04***  -0.04***  -0.01  -0.01  
𝑪 -0.00 -6.66*** 4.03* -4.65** -0.00 -8.96** -1.09 -19.22** 
𝑹𝟐 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.88 0.94 0.94 0.93 
𝝌𝟐 60511*** 2182*** 2959 1948 3136*** 68675*** 60510*** 1930*** 
Notes: ***, ** and * show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Large and small are separate data 
sets classified by the gap being either wide and narrow between the current Chinese technology and the world. 
Separate and interaction indicates that Applied and basic research are either separate variables with coefficients 
or they are combined into one interaction term with one coefficient. IP and A indicate that the dependent variable 
is IP – intellectual property and A is applied research. C is the intercept or constant. 
In the simultaneous equation models, we consider the effect of the dependent variables IP and 
A on each other first. With large gaps IP negatively depends on A which is not the same with 
small gaps. On the contrary, A is positively enhanced by IP with large gaps and negatively with 
small gaps when we do not consider the rest of the research (B or A×B). We could infer that 
when the gap is large then possibly imported IP that is locally registered is then exploited for 
applied research. The more applied research activity there is the less that imported IP is needed 
and firms focus on improving their processes and knowhow in production. This theory could 
possibly be further enhanced if one considers that basic research in large gaps is a significant 
contributor to IP and this is the mechanism that drives more applied research (Nelson, 1959). 
Somewhere there may be an equilibrium growth path in research and its outputs that affect the 
interaction between IP and applied research. Although moderate in comparison, the interaction 
between applied and basic research has a positive outcome on IP. If a small gap is a situation 
where all research has matured, then the production of IP from the combination of applied and 
basic research is moderated inferring that it becomes increasingly harder to find new 
innovations that warrant IP and the focus becomes more on taking basic research through to it 
being applied and then into production. Possibly, the negative driver that IP has on applied 
research is that research is not as important when the gap is small.  
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Moving next to OFDI, such investment has a negative impact on applied research regardless 
of technology, however little impact on IP. However, when we take into account basic research, 
this negative impact turns positive possibly indicating that basic research is a significant driver 
of applied research regardless of the technology gap. This naturally leads us to create an 
additional hypothesis regarding basic and applied research with regard to OFDI and IP which 
we will explore later. 
Next, accounting for the labour force and human capital, the role of the state and the state of 
the economy.  An interesting observation is that employment (H) has a positive effect on IP in 
both large and small gap scenarios (approximately 30% more influence in small gaps) and 
contributes to small gap applied research. In contrast, human capital is negative in large gap 
contributions to IP and positive with applied research suggesting and possibly reinforcing the 
view that the large gap provinces largely import IP and then apply it though applied research. 
Once the domestic economy develops and the gap is small then human capital and employment 
contribute to both IP and applied research reinforcing the view that basic research has a material 
need for human capital development when the gap is wide (Kim, 1998; Girma et al., 2001; 
Hermes and Lensink, 2003). 
Finally, considering the state and economy’s role in the development of IP and applied 
research. As one would expect, growing GDP would have a positive influence with both large 
and small gaps, inflation only in large gaps. What seems to be a contradictory result to the norm 
is that state investment has a negative impact with large gaps and no impact with small. This 
seems to imply that the state somehow displaces new developments. However, if the theory 
that IP is imported holds when the gap is large, then the state could be involved in developing 
the basic and applied research capacity, which might go some way to explain the dynamics. 
When the gap is small then the state’s role becomes irrelevant, again theorising, research 
capacity is most likely self-sustaining rather than needing government intervention relative to 
how it might have been done in large gap provinces.  
5.4.1 Applied, basic research, their roles in technology gap 
Extending H3, we consider the role of basic research as the instrument rather than applied 
research. We report the results in Table 8. 
Table 8 - Role of basic research: 3SLS analysis of the grouping in the frontier technology distance 
 Large Small 
Separate Interaction Separate Interaction 
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Dependent 𝑰𝑷 𝑩 𝑰𝑷 𝑩 𝑰𝑷 𝑩 𝑰𝑷 𝑩 
𝑰𝑷  0.05  0.85***  0.05  0.47*** 
𝑨 -0.71*** 0.53***  0.37*** -7.41 0.76***  0.70*** 
𝑩 1.61***    9.71    
𝑨 × 𝑩   0.29***    0.14***  
𝑶𝑭𝑫𝑰 -0.11***  0.08***  -0.26  0.003  
𝑨 × 𝑶𝑭𝑫𝑰  0.01***  -0.002  0.001  0.001 
𝑯 0.71*** 0.02 0.64*** -0.67*** 0.29 0.02 1.15*** -0.54*** 
𝑯𝑪 -0.45 -0.57** -0.95*** -0.70** -15.78 1.70*** -0.26 -0.42 
𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬 -1.20**  -1.44***  0.79  0.44  
𝒑𝑮𝑫𝑷 0.42***  0.14**  0.14  0.25***  
𝒑𝑰𝑵𝑭 -0.05***  -0.03**  0.07  -0.02  
𝑪 -0.92 6.16*** 3.20 8.73 100.16 -10.78*** -1.22 -4.92 
𝑅2 0.89 0.93 0.95 0.89 -3.35 0.95 0.87 0.93 
𝜒2 2137*** 2032*** 2912*** 1441*** 329*** 3463*** 1300*** 3069*** 
Notes: ***, ** and * show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Large and small are separate data 
sets classified by the gap being either wide and narrow between the current Chinese technology and the world. 
Separate and interaction indicates that applied and basic research are either separate variables with coefficients or 
they are combined into one interaction term with one coefficient. IP and B indicate that the dependent variable is 
IP – intellectual property and A is applied research. C is the intercept or constant. 
Following on from the Table 7 results and contrasting them with Table 8, applied and basic 
research have a magnified influence on IP, whereas employment and human capital effects are 
moderated when we do not consider interactions. When the instrument is basic research and is 
the dependent variable, then applied research, OFDI and human capital play a significant 
positive role whereas IP does not. Basic research has a significant role in developing IP (first 
column) and the mechanism for enhancing OFDI and human capital in IP development is 
though basic research. This potentially reinforces the argument that governments should 
encourage OFDI spillovers into the local economy and human capital development in the 
provinces to develop their economy and close the gap. Considering the interaction between 
applied and basic research, this is a driver for IP activity and IP with applied research has a 
significant positive impact on basic research. A counter-intuitive result is that, with a large gap, 
human capital has a negative impact on basic research whereas when considering Table 7 
human capital plays a positive role in applied research. This would imply that provinces focus 
resources on applied research, however this has a negative impact on IP and basic research is 
a major driver, this presents a policy conundrum. To narrow the gap (IP) then basic research is 
a core driver, however that is not supported by human capital development. One could surmise 
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that the specialist nature of basic research involves such a small part of the working population 
that the effects would be minimal.  
5.4.2 Research analysis and discussion 
When we consider the small gap, human aspects play no role in IP development however, 
human capital becomes significant in the context of basic research. Moreover, one could 
question the role of IP considering that it has no significant contributors, nor does it contribute 
to basic research. This implies that there is a structural change in the dynamics of the provincial 
economies suggesting that the threshold is likely to uncover differences. Taking the interaction 
model with the small gap then as with large gaps, IP and applied research have a significant 
positive impact, however, to a much lesser degree than wide gaps. It is important to consider 
how the interaction between applied and basic research contributes to IP development to a 
lesser extent than large gap provinces. Let’s consider a scenario: a province with a large gap 
might find that human capital development is detrimental to basic research and decide to limit 
the investment. However, this may compromise both applied research and growth particularly 
when the gap narrows and the demand from basic research for human knowhow increases. 
There are substantial policy implications in the support of R&D with the effects from the 
underpinning resources to support both applied and basic research in a growing economy.  
Some explanation of this basic research impact could come from Higón (2016). Although his 
was for the Spanish economy, there are some parallels in product pioneering in low to medium 
technology sectors. A developing country with a large gap may not have the necessary 
‘infrastructure’ to conduct high-technology research and many developed nations focus on the 
Hi-tech industries, then this opens an opportunity to conduct basic research so pioneering the 
development of new products.  
We concur with Czarnitzki and Thorwarth (2012) that basic research leads to other R&D, 
however we find that if applied research comes to the fore, then this has a detrimental effect on 
IP development. Furthermore, importing knowhow may not be good for IP development 
(Higón 2016). We observe that ‘importing’ (OFDI) has a negative effect on applied research 
as in Table 7 across the board, whereas if interacted with basic research then there is a positive 
contribution. In Table 8, we observe that OFDI has a negative impact on IP (separate) and 
positive in the interaction model. These effects are somewhat more limited that in Table 7. In 
all cases basic research is fundamental to driving technological innovation and not OFDI or 
applied research. This is most evident when the technology gap is large. Note however, that 
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applied research is instrumental in driving basic research although it is detrimental to 
technological innovation.  
As with Cassiman et al. (2002), we support the view that basic research with the addition of 
OFDI contributes to applied research and that applied research enhances basic research. This 
potentially complements the results of Henard and McFadyen (2005). Applied research is 
greatly enhanced by human capital in contrast to basic research and technological innovation, 
that human capital affects in a detrimental way. One could conjecture that Stern’s (2004) view 
that lower salaries in basic research are less attractive. We may suggest that those best placed 
for basic research may seek alternatives with applied research when the gap is large. Maybe 
basic research is in its infancy when the gap is large. When the gap is small then basic research 
benefits from the human capital stock implying that the demand for highly skilled researchers 
needs to be matched with an equivalent supply for there to be gains in research output. As with 
Cassiman et al. (2002), the investment decisions of a firm in applied or basic research or, IP 
have a direct effect on the absorptive capacity. We find that the interaction between basic 
research and OFDI is the catalyst that drives both applied research and technological 
innovation. Policies that support firms conducting basic research in conjunction with a ‘go-out’ 
OFDI policy are more likely to benefit provincial, as well as national, growth. 
6 Conclusion and policy implications 
Our findings are that OFDI has both a national and provincial effect on the improvement to 
technological innovation if there is support by domestic regional policy. Although national 
governments may have an overall strategy, it can only work if regions (or provinces as in 
China) are able to adapt to the local conditions and circumstances. As such, regions will close 
the gap at different rates depending on policies expanding on the ideas set out in Piperopoulos 
et al. (2018). OFDI, by itself, has a negative effect on regional technological innovation. As 
such, repatriation of knowhow is reliant on the ability of the provincial, regional and national 
economy to absorb such knowledge and skills. Our conclusion is that for OFDI to be effective, 
it needs basic research as a key part of absorption into the local economy, therefore policy 
makers need to ensure that the necessary motivations and environment are suited to basic 
research exploiting OFDI. Failure to do so could lead to OFDI crowding out research. 
An aspect of IP, OFDI and R&D is that it is not a linear relationship, rather a base level of 
provincial R&D and human capital must exist for the efficient and effective take up of such 
repatriated knowhow and absorptive capacity. This presents policy makers with a problem in 
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that they must encourage investment into human capital and R&D. however, they must do that 
at a level that does not saturate the market and crowd out productive activities. As noted in the 
additional H3.1, applied and basic research have different demands on human capital and R&D 
depending on the threshold and distribution of research between applied and basic. Therefore, 
policies must be balanced between motivating domestic firms to ‘go-out’ with an OFDI 
strategy to appropriate technology knowhow whilst encouraging domestic R&D and 
supporting human capital development. OFDI must not be motivated to crowd out local 
development as we might observe in some of the provinces. Our threshold model enhances the 
viewpoints of Phene and Almeida (2008) with the addition of a regional perspective and 
thresholds. 
Further to this it is necessary to consider the impact of OFDI spillovers and scientific research 
on technological innovation according to different absorptive capabilities. We demonstrate that 
technological absorptive capacity relies on the level of regional technological development, 
frontier technological distance and resources such as human capital and R&D stock. Policies 
need to account for regional variation. Our policy recommendations are that for large gap 
provinces, they should focus more on the investment into basic research to improve their 
technology levels and technology absorptive capability to ensure further development and 
better use of OFDI for technology spillovers. Provinces in the small technology group should 
consider the optimal allocation of resources for applied research, basic research and OFDI. 
Their technological development levels are initially relatively high, indicating their previous 
successful efforts in basic research. Therefore, they can try to find the balance between applied 
research and basic research to facilitate an efficient use of resources; they should not ignore 
the important role of basic research for long-run technological development and its positive 
impact on OFDI spillovers because it strengthens the absorptive capacity. Firms from those 
provinces should also be rational when considering conducting OFDI. They are supposed to 
comprehensively analyse the joint effects of basic research, applied research and OFDI 
spillovers according to their own development levels and conditions although it is difficult to 
do so, especially when the government is encouraging OFDI because it boosts overall 
technological progress.  
As to the domestic policy regarding infrastructure, education, human development and R&D 
capability, we demonstrate that there are different thresholds where, at a provincial level, the 
ability to absorb efficiently is compromised when one or more elements is below that threshold. 
This is cogent with the view expressed in Baskaran and Chaarlas (2012), as policy makers need 
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to consider the pre-existing R&D intensity (that includes human capital) to fully assimilate 
OFDI technologies. We add to the policy view in that policy makers must consider if their 
province or region is above or below the threshold.  It could be quite feasible that a policy 
maker would progressively change their strategy, altering the disposition of ‘investments’ as 
they progress. As with China, and drawing parallels into the Indian sub-continent, such 
‘investments’ need not only consider the national perspective, we demonstrate that policy 
makers need to account for regional differences in capability and not a ‘one-size fits all’ 
approach to OFDI and its supporting policies.  
Although OFDI policies in China have been successful in short-cutting the route to developing 
world capabilities, it has drawn much criticism and resentment. Complaints about foreign 
ownership, state controlled commercial spying and IP theft to name a few. Recent trade 
restrictions imposed by America and others may have a long-term attenuating effect on OFDI 
and the ‘go-out’ policy. This may give other developing nations time to ‘catch up’ and exploit 
the opportunities that China has developed. One cannot separate international politics from 
domestic policy when it comes from trade and foreign investment. We leave that matter for 
future research. 
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